

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BOGOTA 3029

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, CO
SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: CERP 0001

1. A. U.S.S. INTEREST. LONG TERM U.S. INTERESTS IN COLOMBIA ARE: 1) BILATERAL TRADE THAT TOTALLED \$1.36 BILLION IN 1976; 2) DIRECT U.S. INVESTMENT OF \$648 MILLION (1975) AND THE PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY OF 20,000 U.S. CITIZENS; 3) COLOMBIA'S POTENTIAL AS A SOURCE OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS - NATURAL GAS, NICKEL, COAL - AND OF FOODSTUFFS SUCH AS COFFEE, SUGAR, AND BANANAS; 4) COLOMBIA'S ROLE AS A SOURCE AND TRANSIT POINT IN THE ILLEGAL NARCOTICS TRADE; 5) COLOMBIA'S ABILITY TO SERVE AS A "BRIDGE" BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE "THIRD WORLD", ESPECIALLY OTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS; 6) COLOMBIA'S POSITION AS ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING DEMOCRACIES IN THE REGION, AND ITS EXCELLENT HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.

2. B. OVERVIEW. THE INTERESTS LISTED ABOVE ARE THE BASIS FOR THE FORMULATION OF A LONG TERM U.S. STRATEGY REGARDING COLOMBIA. THIS STRATEGY SHOULD CONSIST OF POLICIES WHICH WILL PROTECT AND ADVANCE THESE INTERESTS BY 1) MAINTAINING
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AND STRENGTHENING AREAS OF INTERACTION AND CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND COLOMBIA, AND 2) FOSTERING A U.S. COLOMBIAN RELATIONSHIP BASED ON MUTUAL INTEREST AND SHARED IDEALS.

3. THE ATTAINMENT OF THESE GOALS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY

DIFFICULT OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS. SINCE ITS ACCESSION IN AUGUST 1974, THE LOPEZ ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN FAIRLY CONSISTENT IN THE PURSUIT OF WHAT IT PERCEIVES AS COLOMBIA'S INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES WITHOUT REGARD TO THE DESIRES OF THE U.S. , AND IN EMPHASIZING THE CREATION OF MULTIPLE LINKS WITH OTHER NATIONS, ON A SUBREGIONAL AND REGIONAL BASIS AS WELL AS WITH OTHER THIRDS WORLD AND WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THESE TRENDS, WHICH HAVE HAD THE EFFECT OF ERODING THE STILL CLOSE BUT INCREASINGLY COOLER U.S.- COLOMBIAN RELATIONSHIP, CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF THE LOPEZ ADMINISTRATION IN AUGUST 1978, AND PROBABLY BEYOND.

4. IN ADDITION, LOPEZ' OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS HAVE CREATED AN AMBIENCE IN WHICH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR OBJECTIVES WILL BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. THE BROAD POLITICAL SUPPORT WHICH LOPEZ ENJOYED UPON TAKING OFFICE HAS ERODED SIGNIFICANTLY AND WILL CONTINUE TO DIMINISH. THIS IS IN PART A FUNCTION OF THE "LAME DUCK" SYNDROME THAT AFFLICTS ANY COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT; HE MAY NOT SUCCEED HIMSELF. IT ALSO RESULTS FROM OTHER PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO THIS ADMINISTRATION. BOTH OF THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES WHICH FORMERLY WERE SOLIDLY LOYAL TO LOPEZ AND HIS PROGRAMS ARE NOW SHARPLY DIVIDED AND ABSORBED WITH PARTISAN AND FACTIONAL ISSUES; THEIR LOYALTIES ARE INCREASINGLY TO FACTIONAL LEADERS AND TO LOPEZ' POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS. DESPITE THE MAINTENANCE OF HEALTHY ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE DISILLUSIONMENT OF MANY FORMER LOPEZ SUPPORTERS OVER HIS FAILURE TO ACCOMPLISH GOALS TO WHICH HE HAD ASSIGNED HIGH PRIORITY, SUCH AS REDUCING INFLATION, "CLOSING THE BREACH" BETWEEN WELL OFF AND POOR COLOMBIANS (ALTHOUGH HE MAY HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR THIS), SOLVING THE SECURITY PROBLEM AND

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REDUCING CORRUPTION, HAS DEPRIVED LOPEZ OF THE BROAD GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT HE ONCE COMMANDED. AS A RESULT, THE LOPEZ ADMINISTRATION WILL BE FOCUSING ON INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS, WILL HAVE LESS FREEDOM OF ACTION, AND WILL BE MORE SENSITIVE TO INTERNAL PRESSURES, INCLUDING THOSE FROM EXPORTERS TO THE U.S., IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN WHAT SUPPORT IS HAS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NATURALLY IRASCIBLE LOPEZ WILL BE EVEN MORE LIKELY TO REACT AGAINST SLIGHTS, REALS OF FANCIED. MORE SENSITIVE THAN MOST POLITICIANS ABOUT HIS EVENTUAL PLACE IN HISTORY, LOPEZ WILL FEEL GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE BECAUSE OF THE ACCUMULATING FRUSTRATIONS IN HIS EFFORTS TO ATTAIN MANY OF THE IMMEDIATE AND LONG TERM GOALS THAT HE HAS SET HIMSELF, AND THAT HE HAD HOPED WOULD INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF COLOMBIA'S DEVELOPMENT AND ASSURE HIS OWN PLACE IN HISTORY.

5. TO FURTHER FILL LOPEZ' CUP, IN THE WANING DAYS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION TWO OF HIS SONS ARE NOW UNDER PUBLIC ATTACK

FOR ALLEGED IMPROPRIETIES. UNDER THE BURDEN OF THESE PRESSURES AND FRUSTRATION, LOPEZ WILL BE EVEN MORE PRONE TO INTERPRET INNOCENTLY INTENDED ACTS BY THE U.S. AS INVASIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY OR PERSONAL REBUFFS, WITH CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

6. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BE DETERRED BY THESE APPARENT OBSTACLES, AS THERE ARE IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES AND ADVANTAGES WHICH A HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH COLOMBIA OFFERS US. THESE ADVANTAGES NEED TO BE REEMPHASIZED, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF NEW U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIRECTIONS. COLOMBIA IS A FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY, ONE OF THE FEW LWFT IN THE WORLD AND ESPECIALLY IN THE THIRD WORLD. IT HAS AN ADMIRABLE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND IS DISPOSED TO SUPPORT U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. IT CAN CONTINUE TO BE A MODERATING INFLUENCE IN THE CANAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN CAN EXERCISE A MODERATING INFLUENCE, AS WELL, IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE. IT IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER NUCLEAR CONFIDENTIAL

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PROLIFERATION, ARMS TRANSFERS, AND TERRORISM. ITS ARMED FORCES ARE STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THE SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

7. HOW, THEN, SHOULD WE DEAL WITH COLOMBIA IN ORDER TO CAPITALIZE ON THESE ADVANTAGES?

1) TRADE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MAJOR AREA OF INTERACTION. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO HELP COLOMBIA EXPAND ITS TRADE WITH US. WE CAN EXPECT ARGUMENTS FOR SPECIAL REGIONAL TREATMENT, SUCH AS THE LIEVANO PROPOSALS FOR A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE BASIS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE, AND AGAINST QUOTAS OR SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS ON COLOMBIA. THE LIEVANO INITIATIVE SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN OPPORTUNITY, NOT A PROBLEM, SINCE IF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES WERE TO BECOME THE CONCEPTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BOGOTA 3029

E.O. 11652: GDS

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REF: CERP 0001

TRADE TALKS, THE U.S. WOULD BE ON A SOUNDER FOOTING THAN
IN THE PRESENT NORTH-SOUTH, RICH-POOR FRAMEWORK.

2) THE BASICALLY PRO-U.S. ORIENTATION OF KEY ELEMENTS
OF COLOMBIAN SOCIETY IS A FUNDAMENTAL ASSET IN OUR BILATERAL
RELATIONS, AN ASSET TO BE CULTIVATED, NOT TO BE TAKEN FOR
GRANTED. IN A LITERATE AND OPEN SOCIETY SUCH AS COLOMBIA'S,
INFORMATION, CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
ASSUME MAJOR IMPORTANCE. HOWEVER, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS,
INCLUDING INFLATION, THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN THESE AREAS
ARE DECLINING. THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO ARREST THIS TREND
AND INDEED TO SEEK INCREASED RESOURCES.

3) THE AID PIPELINE, NOW ABOUT \$40 MILLION, WILL
DECLINE RAPIDLY OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS AND WILL BE FULLY
DISBURSED BY MIS-1980; LEVERAGE TO MAINTAIN IMPLEMENTATION
AND DISBURSEMENT SCHEDULES IS EXPECTED TO MINISH MORE
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RAPIDLY THAN THE PIPELINE ITSELF AS THE GOC PERCEIVES THE
Dwindling utility as a small and terminating quantum of aid
resources. Recent years' gains in fertility reduction have
depended in part on a mix of U.S. bilateral and centrally
funded assistance and U.S. support, channeled through
international and multilateral organizations; maintenance
of these gains will require explicit support of the
Colombian population program by the U.S. through other
than traditional bilateral channels until at least the
early 1980's. With the phaseout of aid one of the main
channels of U.S. influence will disappear. Although other
alternate channels are available, we foresee no comparable
combination of alternatives which would provide an equivalent
impact on a government level.

4) THE PROVISION OF SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF FMS CREDITS WILL BE OF IMPORTANT HELP IN ASSISTING THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES (CAF) TO CARRY OUT A MODEST MODERNIZATION OF THEIR EQUIPMENT AND PERMIT THE U.S. TO MAINTAIN ITS INFLUENCE WITH THIS IMPORTANT COLOMBIAN INSTITUTION. A CLOSELY RELATED QUESTION IS THE CONTINUING NEED FOR A U.S. MILGROUP PRESENCE ADEQUATELY STAFFED TO CARRY OUT ITS FUNCTIONS, ONE OF WHICH IS THE CLASSIC MILGROUP FUNCTION OF PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND HELPING THE CAF TO MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF U.S. MATERIAL ASSISTANCE, WHICH IT SORELY NEEDS TO COPE WITH ITS RURAL GUERRILLA AND URBAN TERRORIST PROBLEM. ANOTHER FUNCTION, WHICH WE WISH TO EMPHASIZE HERE, IS THAT OF MAINTAINING THIS AREA OF INTERACTION AND CHANNEL OF INFLUENCE WITH THE CAF, INCLUDING CLOSE INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MONITORING OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. THE PHASEOUT OF AID MAKES IT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAT THIS REMAINING AREA OF GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT INTERACTION BE MAINTAINED. THIS GOAL WILL NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE PRECIPITATE REDUCTION OF THE MILGROUP TO A SKELETON THREE-MAN UNIT. ON THE CONTRARY, SUCH A MOVE WILL BE PERCEIVED NEGATIVELY BY THE DAF AND THE GOC AS A TURNING AWAY BY THE U.S. IN THE LIGHT

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OF NEW U.S. POLICY EMPHASES, COLOMBIA AND ITS ARMED FORCES SHOULD MERIT HIGH, EVEN PREFERENTIAL, CONSIDERATION. AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY TODMAN STATED BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON MARCH 22, "WE MUST, OF COURSE, EXERCISE OUR RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL AND NATURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS BASED ON OUR OWN CRITERIA. AND WE SHOULD SHOW A CLEAR PREFERENCE FOR THOSE WHO PRACTICE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY."

5) ONE OF THE POTENTIALLY MOST TROUBLESOME OF OUR AREAS OF INTERACTION WITH COLOMBIA IS THE COMPLICATED SUBJECT OF CONTROLLING THE ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFIC.

8. UNDER PRESENT PROGRAMMING, U.S. COMMODITY AND OTHER ASSISTANCE WHICH IS AIMED AT THE ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVE 2 (BELOW) HAS HIT A HIGH POINT IN FY-77 AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY LARGE THROUGH FY-78. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS ASSISTANCE WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY MONITORED, MAKING FY-77 AND 78 TEST YEARS. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR TO THE GOC, EXPLAINING THAT THE PROVISION OF FUTURE ASSISTANCE WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON THE DEMONSTRATED EFFECTIVENESS (IN TERMS OF OUR GOALS) OF CURRENT PROGRAMS.

9. THE MISSION IS SKEPTICAL THAT, IF PRESENT CONDITIONS PREVAIL, OUR GOALS CAN BE ATTAINED. INFORMATION WE HAVE ACQUIRED DURING RECENT MONTHS CONFIRMS, AND IN SOME CASES EXCEEDS, OUR WORST SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE EXTENT OF NARCOTICS

TRAFFICKING IN COLOMBIA AND OF RELATED CORRUPTION. IN PARTICULAR, EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT SOME IMPORTANT MILITARY, POLICE, AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS--EVEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS--ARE INVOLVED IN TRAFFICKING. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, PROSPECTS OF SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING THE FLOW OF ILLICIT DRUGS, PARTICULARLY COCAINE, TO THE U.S. BY MEANS OF BILATERAL OR UNILATERAL USG PROGRAMS IN COLOMBIA ARE POOR.

10. SHOULD WE BE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT OUR CURRENT FY-77-78
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PROGRAMS ARE NOT ADVANCING US EFFECTIVELY TOWARD OUR GOALS, WE WOULD ENVISAGE ONLY VERY MODEST AMOUNTS OF FUTURE ASSISTANCE, FORMULATED ON THE BASIS OF CAREFUL COST/BENEFIT CALCULATIONS, AND PROBABLY FOCUSED ON PROVIDING NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR COCAINE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES -ON A REGIONAL BASIS-- AND IN THE U.S.

11. IN SUM, THE U.S. CAN REAP IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES FROM A HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH COLOMBIA. TO MAINTAIN THIS RELATIONSHIP WILL REQUIRE THE EXPENDITURE OF A MODEST AMOUNT OF RESOURCES BUT A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF CARE AND ATTENTION BY THE U.S., WHICH WILL BE DEALING WITH A GOV. ABSORBED IN INTERNAL ISSUES LARGELY INVOLVING THE SUCCESSION AND WITH A PRESIDENT VERY MUCH ON THE DEFENSIVE. WE BELIEVE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS MERIT THE EFFORT.

12. C. U.S. OBJECTIVES.

1) TO MAINTAIN A GOV. ATTITUDE OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. AS WELL AS A FAVORABLE OPINION OF THE U.S. IN KEY SECTORS OF COLOMBIAN SOCIETY.

2) TO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE, WITHIN A REGIONAL PROGRAM, THE FLOW OF ILLICIT NARCOTICS, PARTICULARLY COCAINE, TO THE UNITED STATES.

3) TO OBTAIN COLOMBIAN SUPPORT IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, PARTICULARLY FOR PRIORITY U.S. WORLDWIDE AND REGIONAL OBJECTIVES, SUCH AS PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES, OAS SUBJECTS, AND MATTERS RELATED TO THE PANAMA CANAL NEGOTIATIONS.

4) TO ASSIST THE GOV. TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (INCLUDING A REDUCTION

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BOGOTA 3029

E.O. 11652: GDS
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IN THE POPULATION GROWTH RATE CONSISTENT WITH SOUND OVERALL
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING).

5) TO OBTAIN FROM THE GOC MORE PROMPT PROCESSING
BY THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF AMERICAN PRISONERS DURING THE
INCOMMUNICADO
PERIOD.

13. COURSES OF ACTION.
OBJECTIVE 1. THE GOC WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO MAINTAIN
AN ATTITUDE OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. IF
IT PERCEIVES THAT THE U.S. IS RESPONSIVE TO ITS NEEDS AND
CONCERNS, AND IS WILLING TO CONSULT WITH THE GOC ON MATTERS
OF MUTUAL CONCERN. WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC ACTIONS:

A) SEEK TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO U.S. MARKETS FOR
COLOMBIAN PRODUCTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH A HIGH LABOR CONTENT.

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B) RATIFICATION BY THE U.S.SENATE OF THE QUITA
SUENO TREATY. THE RECENT ASSIGNMENT BY THE GOC OF A CAPABLE,
PRESTIGIOUS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S., VIRGILIO BARCO, WILL
PROVIDE A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO SEEK RATIFICATION.

C) SEEK SPECIAL OCCASIONS FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION, AND GENERALLY CONDUCT BILATERAL RELATIONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CREATE A COLOMBIAN PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. AS A SINCERELY INTERESTED FRIEND. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP THAT FOREIGN MINISTER LIEVANO PERCEIVED HE ENJOYED WITH FORMER SECRETARY KISSINGER YIELDED EXCELLENT RESULTS ON OAS SUBJECTS AND AS A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON PANAMA CANAL MATTERS. VISITS SUCH AS THAT OF AMBASSADORS BUNKER AND LINOWITZ AT THE END OF MARCH WILL CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE WAYS TO GAIN THE GOOD WILL AND FRUITFUL COOPERATION OF THE GOC ON MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST.

D) IMPROVE CONTACT WITH LEADERS AND KEY INSTITUTIONS THROUGH EFFECTIVE IV AND FULBRIGHT PROGRAMS.

E) REINFORCE THE IMAGE OF THE U.S. THROUGH AN EFFECTIVE INFORMATION AND CULTURAL PROGRAM, STRESSING THAT THE U.S. IS: A) A LEADER IN THE ARTS AND HUMANITIES, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY; B) A WORLD LEADER ATTEMPTING CONSTRUCTIVELY TO DEAL WITH THE INNUMERABLE FACETS OF AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ORDER; AND C) A FRIEND OF COLOMBIA SINCERELY DESIROUS OF REINFORCING TRADITIONAL BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP.

F) MAINTAIN A STRONG AND POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES. WITH THE PHASEOUT OF AID, IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN LINKAGES AND COLLABORATION WITH KEY LEADERS AND INSTITUTIONS. ONE SUCH EXISTING PROGRAM IS U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING BOTH IMET AND FMS CREDITS. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF AN EFFECTIVELY FUNCTIONING MILITARY GROUP WILL PRESERVE THE FAVORABLE DISPOSITION

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OF THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES, A KEY COLOMBIAN INSTITUTION, TOWARD THE U.S. IT CAN ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO SUCH OTHER U.S. REGIONAL AND WORLD OBJECTIVES AS THE AVOIDANCE OF AN ARMS RACE AND TO COLOMBIA'S ABILITY TO PROTECT ITS INTERNAL STABILITY AND ITS SECURITY.

OBJECTIVE 2.

A) TO FOSTER AT THE HIGHEST GOC POLITICAL LEVEL THE WILL TO TACKLE THE DRUG PROBLEM IN ITS BROADEST TERMS.

B) TO ENCOURAGE CURRENT TRENDS TOWARD JUDICIAL REFORM AND INCREASED GOC FUNDING FOR STRONGER NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS.

C) TO WORK FOR GREATER COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

AMON THE SEVERAL GOC ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND BETWEEN THEM
AND NARCOTICS POLICE IN NEIGHBORING STTES.

D) TO SUSTAIN ACTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMS THAT
ARE SUPPORTIVE OF THE FOREGOING.

OBJECTIVE 3. COLOMBIA, AN ACTIVE AND, FREQUENTLY,
INFLUENTIAL PARTICIPANT IN NUMEROUS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES, IS ALSO WELL PLACED TO SERVE AS A "BRIDGE"
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE THIRD WORLD BY REASON OF ITS
CREDENTIALS BOTH AS AN LDC AND AS A WELL ESTABLISHED
FUNCTIONING DEMOCARACY. FURTHERMORE, CERTAIN LONG ESTABLISHED
COLOMBIAN INTERESTS ARE CONGRUENT WITH KEY U.S. INTEREST;
PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES;
ARMS CONTRO AND DISARMAMENT; A STRONG OAS SYSTEM; A MODERATE
AND FRUITFUL NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE. IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE
THESE ADVANTAGES, WE PROPOSE:

A) TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH GOC OFFICIALS
ON TOPICS OF MUTUAL INTEREST ON A NORMAL BILATERAL BASIS AS
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WELL AS AT INTERNATIONAL FORA.

B) SEE COURSES OF ACTION (C), (D) AND (E), OBJECTIVE 1.

C) TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, SUPPORT COLOMBIAN
INITIATIVES FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZATIONS THAT
WILL ENHANCE ITS "BRIDGE" ROLE, SUCH AS THE OECD.

OBJECTIVE 4.

A) SEE COURSE ACTION (A), OBJECTIVE 1.

B) SUPPORT LARGE SCALE LENDING BY THE IBRD AND IDB
WITH EMPHASIS ON LOANS AIMED AT THE PROBLEMS OF POVERTY AND
UNEMPLOYMENT.

C) SUPPORT COLOMBIAN PROPOSALS TO EXPAND TRADE
WITHING THE HEMISPHERE (LIEVANO PROPOSALS).

D) ASSIST COLOMBIA TO CONTROL THE SPREAD OF
HOOF AND MOUTH DISEASE IN THE NORTHWEST PART OF THE COUNTRY.

E) FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS TO THE GOC TO COMPLETE
THE DARIEN GAP HIGHWAY.

F) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE BILATERAL ASSISTANCE (WITH
FINAL FY 1977 FUNDING), AND COORDINATION BY THE USAID OF
ALL U.S.- ORIGIN ASSISTANCE TO THE COLOMBIAN POPULATION
PROGRAM THROUGH MID-1979; AND ARTICULATE U.S.STRATEGY

FOR CONTINUING ASSISTANCE AND MANAGEMENT COORDINATION THEREAFTER.

OBJECTIVE 5. MAKE KNOWN TO THE GOC, THROUGH REPRESENTATIONS
TO GOC AGENCIES IN COLOMBIA AND THE COLOMBIAN EMBASSY IN
WASHINGTON, THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF CONCERN OF THE USG OVER THE
PLIGHT OF AMERICAN PRISONER IN COLOMBIA, IN PARTICULAR,
LONG PRE-TRIAL PERIODS AND LACK OF CONSULAR ACCESS DURING
THE INCOMMUNICADO PERIOD.

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